What's in a name?

Robert Farley has an excellent article over at TAP on the future implications for NATO in the wake of the Confrontation in the Caucasus (will that get me another link? Please?)

I do, however, have one quibble. Farley Writes:

In Ukraine, the presence of a substantial Russia population means that a shift in geopolitical orientation (away from NATO and toward Russia) is easily conceivable through democratic means. It hardly makes sense to allow Ukraine to join NATO in order to defend it from Russia, then watch Ukraine adopt a pro-Russian stance after the next election.

This really depends a lot on how you define 'Russian.' There is a large Russian-speaking population in Ukraine, and certainly a significant minority of what might be called 'ethnic' Russians, but the ethnic similarity between Russians and Ukrainians, plus hundreds of years of inter-marriage etc. have made it very difficult to draw dividing lines.

On a more practical point, its questionable to what degree that even these 'Russians' look to the Russian Federation as their 'home' country. Most have lived in what is now Ukraine for decades if not centuries. They want friendly relations with Russia for sure, but if Russia starts making moves that harm Ukrainian interests (by which we mean Ukraine as a state) they'll back Kyiv.

This perhaps wasn't the case in 2004 when the East/West, Russian/Ukrainian split came into full light during the Orange Revolution. But the formerly 'Pro-Russian' Party of Regions under Viktor Yanukovych has steadily adopted a more subtly nationalistic programe, albeit based on a more 'civil-inclusive' form of nationalism expressing support for aspects of Russo-Ukrainian culture (such as obviously the Russian language.) This is because, while its partisans are still opposed to the 'Orange' coalitions more 'ethno-cultural' vision of Ukrainian nationalism and statehood (particularly its emphasis on the Ukrainian language) they know that when the gas stops flowing, Donetsk fares just as bad as Lvov. Internatl divisions aside, there are certain issues of interest to the nation as a whole, which the political elite has reached a large degree of consensus on. One of these includes securing independence, with Russia seen as a the primary potential threat.

Demonstrably, the Party of Regions, rather than joining with the Communist Party of Ukraine and other leftist groups in denouncing Georgia during this crisis (sorry, Confrontation in the Caucasus) pointedly announced its neutrality. It has also publicly and repeatedly committed to moving Ukraine towards the EU. Even in the event of a Yanukovych victory at the next election (which is at this point in time, unlikely) its exceedingly unlikely the country will take a lurch towards Moscow.

All my co-workers at my office in Kyiv speak Russian, most as their primary language, while also self-identifying as Ukrainian. You can happily speak either language in the capital in almost any shop without raising an eyebrow (unless you speak it poorly, and with an accent, as I do.) The conflict doesn't seem to be between Kyiv and Moscow, but more between Russophone Ukrainians (who self-identify as such) who would rather not have their distinctive culture absorbed into a single concept of 'Ukrainianess' defined by Western Ukrainophones.

Or to put it another way - when Dynamo Kyiv thrashed Moscow Spartak 4-1 the other night, I was left in absolutely no doubt as to what most of the people surrounding me thought of the result.